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Abstract
Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties
of a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties.
For a system with many minds, the principle requires that the men-
tal properties of each mind of the system cannot change without the
change of the physical properties of the system. In this paper, I argue
that Everett’s theory seems to violate this principle of psychophysical
supervenience. The violation results from the three key assumptions
of the theory: (1) the completeness of the physical description by the
wave function, (2) the linearity of the dynamics for the wave func-
tion, and (3) multiplicity. For a post-measurement state with two
decoherent result branches, multiplicity means that each result branch
corresponds to a mindful observer, whose mental properties supervene
on the branch, and in particular, whose mental content contains a def-
inite record corresponding to the result branch. Under certain unitary
evolution which swaps the two result branches, the post-measurement
state does not change, and the completeness of the physical description
by the wave function then means that the physical state of the com-
posite system does not change. While the linearity of the dynamics
for the wave function requires that each result branch changes, and
correspondingly the mental properties of the observer which supervene
on the branch also change. Thus the principle of psychophysical su-
pervenience as defined above is violated by Everett’s theory.
Psychophysical supervenience is an important principle in the philosophy
of mind. The standard definition.of supervenience is that a set of properties
A supervenes on another set B in case no two things can differ with respect
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to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties
(see McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014). By this definition, psychophysical
supervenience requires that the mental properties of a system cannot change
without the change of its physical properties.
Let me first give two examples which will be relevant to our later analayis
of the status of psychophysical supervenience in Everett’s theory. In the first
example, a physical system has only one mind. The mental properties of the
system can be formally represented by M1(C1), where the subscript index
“1” denotes the identity of the mind, and C1 denotes the mental content
of the mind. This simplified representation is enough for our later analysis.
By this representation, the mental properties of the system can have three
kinds of changes. The first kind of change is the change of mental content.
It can be represented by
M1(C1) →M1(C2). (1)
The second kind of change is the change of identity. It can be represented
by
M1(C1) →M2(C1). (2)
The third kind of change is the change of both identity and mental content.
It can be represented by
M1(C1) →M2(C2). (3)
Obviously the third kind of change is greater than the first two kinds of
changes. When the physical state of the system is unchanged, the principle
of psychophysical supervenience requires that these changes of the mental
properties of the system cannot happen, and the mental properties of the
system should not change, namely
M1(C1) →M1(C1). (4)
In the second example, a physical system has two minds. The men-
tal properties of the system can be formally represented by M1(C1) and
M2(C2), where the subscript indexes “1” and “2” denote the identities of
the two minds, respectively, and C1 and C2 denote the mental contents of
the two minds, respectively. The principle of psychophysical supervenience
requires that the mental properties of each mind of the system cannot change
without the change of the physical state of the system. That is, when the
physical state of the system is unchanged, only the following no-change of
the mental properties of the system is permitted by the principle of psy-
chophysical supervenience:
M1(C1) →M1(C1);M2(C2) →M2(C2). (5)
2
For the purpose of facilating later analysis, let us consider two particular
changes of the mental properties of the system. The first change is
M1(C1) →M1(C2);M2(C2) →M2(C1), (6)
where each mind keeps her identity but swaps her mental content with the
other. Obviously, after this change of each mind, the total mental properties
of the system also change. The second change is
M1(C1) →M2(C2);M2(C2) →M1(C1), (7)
where each mind not only swaps her mental content with the other but
also swaps her identity with the other. Note that although this change is
greater than the first change, the total mental properties of the system do
not change after the change of each mind. However, since psychophysical
supervenience requires that the mental properties of each mind of a system
cannot change without the change of the physical state of the system, this
change will also violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience if the
physical state of the system is unchanged.1
After being familiar with the principle of psychophysical supervenience,
let us turn to Everett’s theory or the Everett interpretation of quantum
mechanics. Everett’s theory assumes that the wave function of a physical
system is a complete description of the system, and the wave function always
evolves in accord with the linear Schro¨dinger equation. In order to solve the
measurement problem, the theory further assumes that after a measurement
with many possible results there appear many equally real worlds, in each
of which there is an observer who is aware of a definite result (Everett,
1957; DeWitt and Graham, 1973; Wallace, 2012). In the following, I will
argue that Everett’s theory seems to violate the principle of psychophysical
supervenience as defined above.
Consider a simple spin measurement. First, suppose an observer O mea-
sures the x-spin of a spin one-half system S being x-spin up, |up〉S .2 By
the Schro¨dinger equation, the physical state of the composite system after
the measurement will evolve into the product state of O recording x-spin up
and S being x-spin up:
|up〉S |ready〉O → |up〉S |up〉O . (8)
According to Everett’s theory, there is still one observer, namely the original
observer, after the measurement, and she is consciously aware of a definite
record, x-spin up.
1One may object this conclusion. See later analysis.
2I will use the elegant Dirac notation throughout this paper.
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Similarly, when the observer O measures the x-spin of a spin one-half
system S being x-spin down, |down〉S , the physical state of the compos-
ite system after the measurement will evolve into the product state of O
recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
|up〉S |ready〉O → |down〉S |down〉O . (9)
Again, according to Everett’s theory, there is still one observer, namely the
original observer, after the measurement, and she is consciously aware of a
definite record, x-spin down. It can be seen that these two mental evolution
belongs to the first kind of mental change. The identity of the observer does
not change, while her mental content changes.
Now consider a unitary time evolution operator, which changes |up〉S |up〉O
to |down〉S |down〉O and |down〉S |down〉O to |up〉S |up〉O, namely swaps the
above two product states. It is similar to the NOT gate for a single q-bit,
and is permitted by the Schro¨dinger equation in principle. Then after the
evolution, the composite system being initially in the product state of O
recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up will be in the product state of O
recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down, namely
|up〉S |up〉O → |down〉S |down〉O . (10)
It seems that Everett’s theory does not state whether the identity of the
observer changes after the evolution. However, it is reasonable to assume
(and I think many Everettians may also agree) that the identity of the
observer does not change after the evolution, since the evolution only changes
one conscious perception (and the relevant memory) of the observer, and it
does not change all other mental properties of the observer, including all
her previous memories. In this case, there is still one observer, namely the
original observer, after the unitary time evolution, and her mental state
changes from being aware of x-spin up to being aware of x-spin down.
Certainly, it may be also possible that the identity of the observer
changes after the evolution according to a certain theory of identity (see
Olson, 2017 for a review of theories of personal identity). In this case, the
evolution should be more properly written as
|up〉S |up〉Ou → |down〉S |down〉Od . (11)
where the identity of the observer changes from Ou to Od, and her mental
state also changes from being aware of x-spin up to being aware of x-spin
down. As noted before, this mental change, which belongs to the third kind
of mental change, is greater than the above mental change of (10), which
belongs to the first kind of mental change.
Similarly, after the unitary time evolution, the composite system being
initially in the product state of O recording x-spin down and S being x-spin
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down will be in the product state of O recording x-spin up and S being
x-spin up, namely
|down〉S |down〉O → |up〉S |up〉O . (12)
Correspondingly, there are also two possible mental evolution. In the first
case, there is still one observer, namely the original observer, after the uni-
tary time evolution, and her mental state changes from being aware of x-spin
down to being aware of x-spin up. In the second case, the identity of the
observer also changes from Od to Ou besides this change of mental state,
and the evolution may be more properly written as
|down〉S |down〉Od → |up〉S |up〉Ou . (13)
These results are plain and familiar. Obviously the above evolution satis-
fies the principle of psychophysical supervenience. The mental properties of
the composite system or the mental properties of the corresponding observer
change with the change of the physical state of the composite system.
Let us consider a more interesting case. Suppose an observer O measures
the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that is in a superposition of two
different x-spins, 1√
2
(|up〉S + |down〉S). By the linear Schro¨dinger equation,
the physical state of the composite system after the measurement will evolve
into the superposition of O recording x-spin up and S being x-spin up and
O recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
1√
2
(|up〉S |up〉O + |down〉S |down〉O). (14)
According to Everett’s theory, this post-measurement state corresponds to
two observers, each of who is consciously aware of a definite record, either
x-spin up or x-spin down.3 Then, when considering the identities of the two
observers, this post-measurement state may be written as
1√
2
(|up〉S |up〉Ou + |down〉S |down〉Od). (15)
There are in general three ways of understanding the notion of multi-
plicity in Everett’s theory: (1) measurements lead to multiple worlds at
the fundamental level (DeWitt and Graham, 1973), (2) measurements lead
to multiple worlds only at the non-fundamental “emergent” level (Wallace,
2012), and (3) measurements only lead to multiple minds (Zeh, 1981).4 In
3Note that in Wallace’s (2012) formulation of Everett’s theory the number of the emer-
gent observers after the measurement is not definite due to the imperfectness of decoher-
ence. My following analysis also applies to this formulation.
4Note that Albert and Loewer’s (1988) many-minds theory does not assume the usual
notion of multiplicity as listed above. It assumes the existence of infinitely many minds
even for a post-measurement product state, and it already entails dualism and violates
the principle of psychophysical supervenience. I will not discuss this theory in this paper.
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either case, for the above post-measurement state (15), the mental state of
each observer is not determined uniquely by her whole wave function, but
determined only by a branch of the wave function.5
Now consider again the above unitary time evolution operator, which
changes the first branch of the superposition to its second branch and the
second branch to the first branch:
1√
2
(|up〉S |up〉O+|down〉S |down〉O) →
1√
2
(|down〉S |down〉O+|up〉S |up〉O).
(16)
It can be seen that after the evolution the whole superposition does not
change. According to Everett’s theory, the wave function of a physical sys-
tem is a complete description of the system. Therefore, after the above
unitary time evolution the physical state of the composite system does not
change.
On the other hand, as noted above, the above physical evolution has two
possible corresponding mental evolution. In the first case, the identity of
each observer does not change. Then the evolution will be
1√
2
(|up〉S |up〉Ou+|down〉S |down〉Od) →
1√
2
(|down〉S |down〉Ou+|up〉S |up〉Od).
(17)
In this case, like the corresponding product state case, after the evolution
the mental state of each observer, which is determined by the corresponding
branch of the superposition, will change; the mental state determined by
the first branch will change from being aware of x-spin up to being aware
of x-spin down, and the mental state determined by the second branch will
change from being aware of x-spin down to being aware of x-spin up.6 This
is similar to the first change in the second example discussed above, namely
(6). In the second case, the identity of each observer also changes besides
the change of her mental state. Then the evolution will be
1√
2
(|up〉S |up〉Ou+|down〉S |down〉Od) →
1√
2
(|down〉S |down〉Od+|up〉S |up〉Ou).
(18)
This is similar to the second change in the second example discussed above,
namely (7).
Therefore, Everett’s theory predicts that after the above unitary time
evolution the physical state of the composite system does not change, while
5It is worth noting that if the mental state of each observer is not determined by the
corresponding branch of the post-measurement superposition, then the predictions of the
theory will be not consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics and experience
for some unitary time evolution of the superposition.
6This is required by the linearity of dynamics. See below for further discussion.
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the mental properties of the two involved observers both change after the
evolution. According to the previous analysis of psychophysical superve-
nience, this means that Everett’s theory violates the principle of psychophys-
ical supervenience in the above example.
There are two possible ways to avoid the violation of psychophysical
supervenience. The first way is to deny that after the evolution the physical
state of the composite system has not changed. This requires that the wave
function of a system is not a complete description of the physical state of
the system, and additional variables are needed to introduce to describe
the complete physical state. However, this requirement is not consistent
with Everett’s theory. Moreover, it is worth noting that in order to save
psychophysical supervenience, it is also required that the additional variables
should be changed by the unitary time evolution of the wave function, and
the mental state of an observer should also supervene on the additional
variables; otherwise the introduction of these variables cannot help save
psychophysical supervenience in the above example.
The second way to avoid the violation of psychophysical supervenience in
the above example is to deny that after the evolution the total mental states
of the composite system have changed. This possibility deserves a more
careful analysis. It seems uncontroversial that if the identity of each observer
does not change during the above unitary time evolution (see (17)), then
Everett’s theory will violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience.
If each observer has a trans-temporal identity and her mental state changes
after the evolution, then the total mental properties of the composite system,
which are composed of the mental properties of these observers, also change
after the evolution. In this case, the total mental properties of the system
are obviously different before and after the evolution (17).
However, it may be debatable whether Everett’s theory really violates
the principle of psychophysical supervenience when each observer also swaps
her identity with the other after the above unitary time evolution (see (18)).
The total mental properties of the composite system are the same before
and after the evolution after all. If we define psychophysical supervenience
for a system with many minds as the requirement that the mental properties
of each mind cannot change without the change of the physical state of the
system, then even if each observer swaps her identity with the other after
the above evolution (18), Everett’s theory also violates this requirement of
psychophysical supervenience.
If one insists that Everett’s theory does not violate the principle of psy-
chophysical supervenience for the evolution (18), then one will meet at least
two difficulties. The first one is that one must find a reasonable theory of
identity to explain why the identity of an observer changes when all but
one conscious perception (and the relevant memory) of the observer keeps
unchanged. The second difficulty is that one must explain why and how the
principle of psychophysical supervenience permits that when a system has
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many observers the mental properties of each observer may change without
the change of the physical state of the system. It is arguable that the second
difficulty is much harder to solve than the first difficulty.
Here it may be worth noting that if one deny that each observer has her
identity, then the violation of psychophysical supervenience can be avoided
in the above example. The reason is that after the above evolution there
remain a mental state corresponding to seeing a spin up result and a mental
state corresponding to seeing a spin down result, and thus the total mental
states of the composite system have not changed. However, the absence
of identities of observers seems obviously inconsistent with our experience.
Moreover, if each observer has no identity in the above example, then this
seems equivalent to say that there is only one observer with two mental
contents, which are seeing a spin up result and seeing a spin down result
(see Gao, 2016, 2017 for further discussion). This is not consistent with
Everett’s theory.
In order to avoid the violation of psychophysical supervenience, one may
even assume that after the above unitary time evolution the identity and
mental state of each observer are not changed. However, the mental dynam-
ics must also keep the identity and mental state of an observer being in one
branch of the above superposition (14) unchanged so that the mental dynam-
ics is still linear.7 This seems inconsistent with the predictions of quantum
mechanics and experience. On the other hand, if the mental dynamics still
changes the mental state of the observer being in one branch of the above
superposition (14) as usual, then the mental dynamics must be nonlinear.
Although a nonlinear dynamics for the physical state or the wave function
is obviously inconsistent with Everett’s theory, a nonlinear dynamics for the
mental state seems to be not prohibited by the theory; the many-minds the-
ory is an example (Albert and Loewer, 1988; Barrett, 1999). However, the
existence of a nonlinear dynamics for the mental state in Everett’s theory
already entails dualism. It seems that this is no better than the violation of
psychophysical supervenience. Moreover, such a nonlinear dynamics seems
very ad hoc, and it is also difficult to determine what the dynamics is for an
arbitrary superposition such as α |up〉S |up〉O +β |down〉S |down〉O, where α
and β are not zero and satisfy the normalization condition |α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
Finally, one may argue that the above superposition (14) is a very special
state, and thus the violation of psychophysical supervenience, even if it
7A linear dynamics requires that the evolution of one branch of a superposition is
independent of the evolution of other branches, as well as whether or not these branches
exist. Thus, by the same unitary evolution operator, the evolution of one branch of the
post-measurement superposition (14), such as the branch |up〉S |up〉O in the sperposition,
will be the same as the evolution of the post-measurement state containing only this
branch, such as the product state |up〉S |up〉O. This is true for the evolution of both the
physical state and the mental state. Otherwise the linearity of dynamics will be violated,
and the resulting dynamics will be nonlinear.
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exists, is not serious for Everett’s theory. For other states, the amplitudes of
the two branches of the superposition are different, and thus after the above
evolution the physical state of the composite system, like the mental states of
the system, will also change. Then the psychophysical supervenience will not
be violated for these states. However, for a general superposition we can use
an additional unitary time evolution operator, which changes α |up〉S |up〉O+
β |down〉S |down〉O to β |up〉S |up〉O +α |down〉S |down〉O, besides the above
unitary time evolution operator. Then by the combination of the two unitary
time evolution operators which is still unitary, the superposition may also
keep unchanged. But, by a similar analysis as above, the mental properties
of the system change after the evolution.
In addition, even if using only the original unitary time evolution oper-
ator, it seems that there is still a potential problem with the realization of
psychophysical supervenience for some other states. When the difference of
the amplitudes of the two branches of a post-measurement superposition is
very small, the change of the physical state of the composite system is also
very small after the evolution. But the change of the mental state of each
observer is still very large, e.g. from being aware of x-spin down to being
aware of x-spin up. In this case, although the psychophysical supervenience
is not violated in a strict sense, it seems very difficult or even impossible to
explain how the mental state supervenes on the physical state.
To sum up, I have argued that Everett’s theory seems to violate the prin-
ciple of psychophysical supervenience. The violation results from the three
key assumptions of the theory: (1) the completeness of the physical descrip-
tion by the wave function, (2) the linearity of the dynamics for the wave
function, and (3) multiplicity. It seems that one must go beyond Everett’s
theory in order to avoid the violation of psychophysical supervenience.
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